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PROBLEMS WITH THE 1990 REVISION OF ARTICLES
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

3 AND 4 OF THE

D. Fenton Adams*
In 1990 the sponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code' approved

a completely rewritten Article 32 and a substantially amended Article
4,3 along with some conforming amendments to Article 1. The
officially stated purposes of the revisions were "to accommodate
... changing [business] practices and modern technologies, the needs
of a rapidly expanding national and international economy, the
requirement for more rapid funds availability, and the need for
more clarity and certainty." ' 4 Other motivations were apparently at
work as well: a desire to eliminate any suggestion of gender bias
in the statutory language5 and indulgence of the revisers' stylistic
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
1. The sponsors were the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
2. Article 3 was captioned "Commercial Paper" in the previous text. U.C.C.
§ 3-101 (1989). It is titled "Negotiable Instruments" in the revision. U.C.C. § 3101 (1990).
3. Article 4 is captioned "Bank Deposits and Collections" in both versions.
U.C.C. § 4-101 (1989); U.C.C. § 4-101 (1990). The 1990 revisions of Articles 3
and 4 had been adopted in 26 states by the Spring of 1993. U.C.C. Committee
Update, 1992 A.B.A. Bus. L. SEc. 14-15 (June 1993). The changes were made in
Arkansas in 1991. Act of Mar. 15, 1991, No. 572, § 5, 1991 Ark. Acts 572 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-3-101 to 4-4-111 (Michie 1991)).
*

4. AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON

UNIFORM STATE

LAWS,

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE,

Prefatory Note to Article 3

(1990).
5. The use of the pronoun "he" and its variants as referring to a person of
either sex, common in the former versions of Articles 3 and 4, has been eliminated
from the revisions. For example, § 3-203 of the previous text read as follows:
Where an instrument is made payable to a person under a misspelled
name or one other than his own he may indorse in that name or his own
or both; but signature in both names may be required by a person paying
or giving value for the instrument.
U.C.C. § 3-203 (1989). In the revision, the subsection dealing with the same problem
reads:
If an instrument is payable to a holder under a name that is not the
name of the holder, indorsement may be made by the holder in the name
stated in the instrument or in the holder's name or both, but signature
in both names may be required by a person paying or taking the instrument
for value or collection.
U.C.C. § 3-204(d) (1990). While the wording of the revision appears to differ from
the former version partly to effect a slight change in the substance of the rule,
the major objective of the revision appears to have been to substitute for "he"
and "his" the gender-neutral noun "holder" and its possessive. The substitutions
cannot be said to do much for the elegance of the prose, but all suggestion of
sexual preference has been rooted out.
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tastes.6
The result, particularly in Article 3, has been to raise many
new problems of interpretation. Variations in language between the
former version of the official text and the new version may or may
not reflect intended changes in the substance of the law, but the
purposes of the new wording are not always clear. Even where a
change in the legal rule seems clearly signaled, its scope or reason
may not be apparent, raising questions of the correct application
of the new rule or perhaps arousing suspicion whether a change in
substance really is intended.
The drafters of the revision encourage readers to rely on the
revised official comments for answers to such questions.7 These
comments do explain some intended changes, but they fall well short
of explaining all of the discrepancies between the two official texts.
Additional enlightenment, the draftsmen have suggested, may be
found by comparing the official comments of the old and new
versions, for the draftsmen contend that all of the former comments
which are still pertinent have been carried forward to the comments
on the revised text, at least in substance. 8 It may therefore be
assumed, presumably, that if the official comments to the revision
do not echo the former comments on any particular point, the law
with which those comments dealt has been changed.
Notwithstanding these guides to correct interpretation, this writer
has encountered a number of areas of uncertainty with regard to
the effect of the 1990 revisions of Articles 3 and 4 on the law of
negotiable instruments and bank deposits and collections. Some of
these problems are discussed below.
6. A notable example of this is the conversion of section subdivision designations
from numbers to letters to designate subsections and from letters to numbers for
subsection divisions. Thus, for example, § 3-104(l)(a) of the 1989 Official Text has
become § 3-104(a)(1) in the 1990 Official Text. Since these changes have been made
only in Articles 3 and 4, they have produced an inconsistency of style within the
code. Article 4A, an Article added to the Official Text in 1989, conforms, in this
respect, to the revised versions of Articles 3 and 4. However, Article 2A, added
in 1987, does not.
Some of the new languge has been motivated by a desire to replace what was
considered archaic usage. See Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Introduction,
Symposium: Revised U.C.C. Articles 3 & 4 and New Article 4A, 42 ALA. L. REv.
373, 385 (1991). Professors Jordan and Warren, of the UCLA School of Law,
were the reporters for the revision project. Id. at 373.
7. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 6, at 386.
8. Jordan & Warren, supra note 6, at 386. See also Continuation of Discussion
of Uniform Commercial Code, Articles 3 and 4, 67 A.L.I. PRoc. 452 (1990)
(presenting statement by Professor Robert Jordan, reporter).
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I.

DELIVERY

Under the former version of Article 3, it was assumed that
contractual liability on a negotiable instrument depended not only
on the contracting party's signing of the instrument but also on his
or her delivery of it. Section 3-306, in listing defenses to which a
taker of an instrument who did not have the rights of a holder in
due course would be subject, included "the defenses of ... nonperformance of any condition precedent, nondelivery, or delivery
for a special purpose." 9 The section did not say what parties could
use these defenses, but the official comments indicated that any
signer of a negotiable instrument could, 0 although acceptors were
subject to a special rule that permitted a notification to serve as a
substitute for delivery."
Revised Article 3 appears to limit nondelivery and conditional
delivery defenses to makers, drawers, and acceptors of negotiable
instruments. As to makers and drawers, revised section 3-105, which
deals with "Issue of Instrument", defines "issue" in subsection (a)
as "the first delivery of an instrument by the maker or drawer ....
The next subsection provides:
An unissued instrument, or an unissued incomplete instrument
that is completed, is binding on the maker or drawer, but nonissuance is a defense. An instrument that is conditionally issued
or is issued for a special purpose is binding on the maker or
drawer, but failure of the condition or special purpose to be
13
fulfilled is a defense.
4
With regard to acceptors, the section defining "acceptance"'
provides that "[a]cceptance . . . becomes effective when notification
pursuant to instructions is given or the accepted draft is delivered
for the purpose of giving rights on the acceptance to any person."' 5
This appears to preserve the nondelivery (and perhaps the conditional

9. U.C.C. § 3-306(c) (1989).
10. See id. § 3-410 cmt. 5 (referring to "the usual rule that no obligation on
an instrument is effective until delivery."). The doctrine is long standing. The
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, predecessor of Article 3 of the U.C.C.,
provided in § 16 that "[elvery contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete
and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect
thereto." See also WILLIAm E. BRITTON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BILLS AND
NOTES § 50 (2d ed. 1961).
11. U.C.C. § 3-410(1) (1989).
12. U.C.C. § 3-105(a) (1990).
13. Id. § 3-105(b).
14. Id. § 3-409.
15. Id. § 3-409(a).
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delivery) defense in much the same modified form as the previous

version of Article 3. 16

In dealing with the obligations of indorsers, however, the text
of revised Article 3 contains no hint that delivery is necessary to
make an indorser's obligation effective or that the indorser may use
defenses of nondelivery and conditional delivery. The comments
suggest that the defenses are not available to an indorser, for a
comment to section 3-305,' 7 discussing defenses that are "cut off
by a holder in due course," makes no mention of delivery related
defenses other than "nonissuance of the instrument, conditional
issuance, and issuance for a special purpose."' 8
Is one to conclude that there is no delivery requirement applicable
to the obligations of indorsers under revised Article 3? The best
one can say in defense of continuance of the requirement is that
neither the text nor the comments of the revision say that the old
rule has been abandoned. It might be regarded as a matter on which
the text of the revision is silent, opening the door to importation
of the traditional rule by resort to the law merchant by authority
of section 1-103; 19 however, the very fact that the revision explicitly
recognizes delivery requirements for the obligations of makers, drawers, and acceptors argues for treating the silence of the text as to
the obligations of indorsers as carrying a negative implication. Moreover, the former comment that "no obligation on an instrument is
effective until delivery" 20 is not included in the comments of the
2
revision. 1
16. See supra text accompanying note 11.

17. U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2 (1990).
18. Id. This comment does not even acknowledge that an acceptor could have
a defense of this nature. However, the provision in revised § 3-409 that acceptance
"becomes effective" when notification is given or when the instrument is delivered,
would be meaningless unless the acceptor would have a defense based on the lack
of notification or delivery, which would at least be valid against one who did not
have the rights of a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-409 (1990).
The defenses of nondelivery and conditional delivery were "personal defenses,"
defenses to which holders in due course are generally immune under former Article
3. Compare U.C.C. § 3-306(c) (1989) with § 3-305(2) (1989). They appear to be
personal defenses under revised Article 3 as well, insofar as the obligations of
makers and drawers are concerned and are probably so as to the obligations of
acceptors. See U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2 (1990). Compare id. § 3-305(a) with § 3-

305(b).
19. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990) states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions
of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant . . . shall
supplement its provisions." This section was not changed in the 1990 Official Text.
Cf. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1989).

20. See supra note 10.
21. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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A possible alternative solution would be to reason that the
explicit rules regarding delivery by makers, drawers, and acceptors
reflect an underlying policy that delivery is normally a requirement
for an effective contract on a negotiable instrument. The implication
is that the requirement applies to indorsers as well by reliance on
the injunction of section 1-102(1) that "[tihis Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.' '22 Is there such an underlying policy, however? The elimination
from the comments of the statement to that effect 23 argues against
it.
II.

VALUE

One of the traditional requirements for "holder in due course"
status has been that the candidate have taken the instrument "for
value." This was true under the former version of Article 3,4 and
it remains true under the revision. 25 The concept of value has required
definition, and the definition in revised Article 3 differs from that
of its predecessor. The difference raises a startling question of
whether a payment of cash for an instrument qualifies as value.
Suppose, for example, that a bank cashes a check drawn on another
bank for the payee, who is not already a customer of the cashing
bank. Could the bank qualify as a holder for value, so as to be
a holder in due course of the check?
Former section 3-303 fairly clearly yielded the "yes" answer
dictated by common sense. It provided that "[a] holder takes the
instrument for value (a) to the extent that the agreed consideration
has been performed. '"26 The most nearly equivalent passage in revised
22. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1990). This provision was the same in the pre-1990
Official Text. A comment to the section explains:
The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and
policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole,
and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or
broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies
involved.
Id. cmt. 1. See also ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

1-8 (1985).

23. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
24. U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (1989) states: "A holder in due course is a holder who
takes the instrument (a) for value . ..."

25. U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (1990) states: 'holder

in due course' means the holder

of an instrument if: ... (2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value."

26. U.C.C. § 3-303(a) (1989). The phrase "agreed consideration" did not necessarily call for an agreement prior to the performance. In informal contract
terminology, "[tlo constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1979). "A
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section 3-303, however, provides that "[a]n instrument is issued or
transferred for value if: (1) the instrument is issued or transferred
for a promise of performance, to the extent the promise has been
performed. ' 27 Under this wording a payment of money would be
value only if it was done in performance of a prior promise; cashing
a check for a stranger, without any previous bargain between the
parties, would not qualify. 28
Can this be so? It is a seemingly ridiculous proposition, yet
revised Article 3 expressly treats performance as value only if there
has been a prior promise of such performance, and the very fact
that the wording has been revised suggests an intention to change
the law. If such a bizarre change were intended, one would expect
to find some reference to it in the official comments, but they are
silent on the question.
In this instance, it is probably legitimate to infer an underlying
policy that would treat actual performance as value, whether preceded
by a promise of such performance or not, and on that basis to
read section 3-303(a) as implying that a payment of money in
circumstances such as those of the hypothetical case would qualify
as value, by authority of section 1-102(l).29 The revised comment
to section 3-303 explains the "policy basis" for the rule of subsection
(a)(1) as being "that the holder who gives an executory promise of
performance will not suffer an out-of-pocket loss to the extent the
executory promise is unperformed at the time the holder learns of
performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise."
Id. § 71(2). An "agreed consideration" would be something bargained for and
given in exchange, and it may take the form of either a performance or a promise.
27. U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(1) (1990).
28. Revised § 3-303(a) defines situations involving transfer "for value," but
none of those situations is as helpful as the prior version stated in the text. The
subsection, in its entirety, provides:
(a) An instrument is issued or transferred for value if:
(1) the instrument is issued or transferred for a promise of performance,
to the extent the promise has been performed;
(2) the transferee acquires a security interest or other lien in the instrument other than a lien obtained by judicial proceeding;
(3) the instrument is issued or transferred as payment of, or as security
for, an antecedent claim against any person, whether or not the
claim is due;
(4) the instrument is issued or transferred in exchange for a negotiable
instrument; or
(5) the instrument is issued or transferred in exchange for the incurring
of an irrevocable obligation to a third party by the person taking
the instrument.
U.C.C. § 3-303(a) (1990).
29. Id. § 1-102(1); see supra text accompanying note 22.
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[the] dishonor of the instrument" because the holder will be excused
from his obligation to perform his promise, and in such circumstances
"[hjolder-in-due-course status is not necessary to protect" the holder. 0
The reasoning is obviously inapplicable to a case where a holder
has rendered a performance in exchange for an instrument, even if
it is not preceded by a promise to perform. Hence, construction of
section 3-303 to promote its underlying purposes and policies calls
for extending its reach to the case supposed.
Another route to the same end would be to read section 3303(a) as not dealing comprehensively with the meaning of value;
it asserts that value is to be found in specified situations but does
not imply that these are the only situations in which value can be
found. 3' This would give courts discretion to fall back on traditional
law merchant concepts to identify the other situations. Still, one
wonders why the drafters of the revision chose to deal less clearly
with the subject than did the version of Article 3 which they were
superseding.
III.

CERTIFICATION

Revised section 3-401(a) 32 in substance continues the rule of
former section 3-401(1)33 that no person is liable on a negotiable
instrument unless his signature (made personally or by an agent)
appears on the instrument. Consistent with this rule, revised section
3-409(a) defines "acceptance" as "the drawee's signed agreement to
pay a draft as presented. It must be written on the draft and may
' 34
consist of the drawee's signature alone."
"Certified check" is defined in revised section 3-409(d) as "a
check accepted by the bank on which it is drawn. Acceptance may
be made as stated in subsection (a) or by a writing on the check
which indicates that the check is certified. ' 35 The latter sentence
30. Id. § 3-303 cmt. 2.

31. However, at least one commentator on revised Article 3 assumes that § 3303(a) is a comprehensive definition of "value" for purposes of determining whether
a purchaser of an instrument qualifies as a holder in due course. See Milton
Copeland, A Statutory Primer: Revised Article 3 of the U.C.C. - Negotiable
Instruments, ARK. L. NoTEs 67, 76 n.35 (1992). Professor Copeland does not
discuss the specific question raised in the text of this article. Henry J. Bailey and
Richard B. Hagedorn, the authors of Brady on Bank Checks, see no substantial
difference between the definitions of "value" in former § 3-303 and the 1990
revision. HENRY J. BAILEY & RicHARD B. HAGEDORN, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS
6-6 n.24 (7th ed. 1992).
32. U.C.C. § 3-401(a) (1990).
33. U.C.C. § 3-401(1) (1989).
34. U.C.C. § 3-409(a) (1990).

35. Id. § 3-409(d).

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:665

could be read to mean that if certification takes the form of "a
writing on the check which indicates that the check is certified,"
then the drawee's signature need not appear on the instrument, since
this method of certification is distinguished from "acceptance" as
defined in subsection (a), which requires signature on the instrument.
Is this reading correct? The comments to section 3-409 do not
discuss the matter. It is not apparent why there should be any
exception to the signature requirement for cases where a drawee of
a check stamps it "Certified, 3 6 and the unqualified statement of
the signature requirement in section 3-401 argues for a reading of
section 3-409(d) consistent with it. The distinction between the acceptance in section 3-409(a) and a writing on the check indicating
that it is certified can be understood to mean that an express
indication that a check is certified is to be taken as the equivalent
3' 7
of an "agreement to pay [the] draft as presented.
IV.

PAYMENT OR ACCEPTANCE BY MISTAKE

Section 3-418 of former Article 3 declared that, with certain
exceptions, "payment or acceptance of any instrument is final in
favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith
changed his position in reliance on the payment. 38 The official
comments explained that the section was meant to codify "the rule
of Price v. Neal. . . , under which a drawee who accepts or pays
an instrument on which the signature of the drawer is forged is
' 39
bound on his acceptance and cannot recover back his payment
and to follow decisions under prior law which applied the doctrine
of Price v. Neal to some other kinds of erroneous payments. 40
Section 3-418 of revised Article 341 contains a more elaborate
body of rules, but the thrust of the section is much the same. A
36. It is true that revised Section 3-401(b) provides that "[a] signature may be
made . . . by the use of any name . . . or by a word, mark, or symbol executed
or adopted by a person with present intention to authenticate a writing," and
arguably, a bank's "certified" stamp is treated as its signature by Section 3-409(b).
Id. § 3-401(b). However, if any such novel treatment of the "signature" concept
were intended, surely the comments to Section 3-409(b) would so indicate.
37. Bailey and Hagedorn assert that both the pre-1990 and 1990 Official Texts
of the U.C.C. require certifications to be signed, and they cite a case decided
under the pre-1990 version. See supra note 31, at 10-4, 10-7. In this case, the
court held that a bank's certification stamp did not constitute a certification under
the code because it was not signed by any official of the bank. Menke v. Board
of Educ., 211 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1973). Bailey and Hagedorn apparently regarded

this holding as a sound decision under either version of Article 3.
38. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1989).
39. Id. § 3-418 cmt. 1.
40. Id. § 3-418 cmt. 2.
41. U.C.C. § 3-418 (1990).
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good deal of the new language is designed to make explicit what
was assumed by former section 3-418, that payment or acceptance
by mistake is involved and that the remedies for such mistake rest
on the law of mistake in contracting and the law of restitution. 42
Subsection (a) explicitly confers a right on the drawee of a draft
to avoid an acceptance or recover a payment made in the two most
frequent instances in which the problem presents itself: in the mistaken belief that payment of the draft had not been stopped or that
the signature of the drawer was authorized .4 Subsection (b) refers
to "the law governing mistake and restitution" for rules granting
rights of avoidance or restitution in other mistake situations." Subsection (c) then provides a rule overriding both of the previous
subsections: "The remedies provided by subsections (a) or (b) may
not be asserted against a person who took the instrument in good
faith and for value or who in good faith changed position in reliance
on the payment or acceptance. ' 45 The comment indicates that subsections (a) and (c), taken together, "are consistent with former
section 3-418 and the rule of Price v. Neal," 4 and subsections (b)
and (c), taken together, are presumably thought to be consistent
with prior law extending the principle of Price v. Neal to other
mistake situations.
Although there is general consistency between the old and new
versions of section 3-418, there are some differences. For example,
whereas the former version protected a holder in due course, subsection (c) of the revision substitutes the expression "person who
took the instrument in good faith and for value," a broader category.
And whereas the old version protected a person who changed position
in good faith only if he did so in reliance on a payment, the new
version also protects one who changes position in good faith in
reliance on acceptance.
The comments to the earlier version of section 3-418 indicated
that there was a third category of persons protected under the rule
of that section, that the "finality" rule also applied in favor of "a
transferee who has the rights of a holder in due course under the
shelter principle." ' 47 The reference there was apparently to the rule
of section 3-201(1) that "[t]ransfer of an instrument vests in the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. § 3-418 cmt. 1.
Id.
See U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 3 (1990).
Id. § 3-418(c).
Id. § 3-418 cmt. 1.
U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 3 (1989).
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transferee such rights as the transferor has therein . . . ,"4 though
the comment to section 3-41849 seemed to read section 3-201(1)
broadly as giving a transferee of an instrument the transferor's
immunities as well as the transferor's rights.
This extension of the rule of finality of section 3-418 could be
of considerable importance. Suppose a collecting bank handled a
forged check on behalf of a customer who was a holder in due
course, but the bank was not a holder in due course itself because
it did not give value. If it collected payment from the drawee bank,
which paid without discovering that the drawer's signature was not
genuine, in a suit by the drawee to recover the payment from the
collecting bank the defendant bank might not be able to show that
it had changed its position in reliance on the payment. In that event
the collecting bank would have no defense unless it could invoke
protection under the "shelter principle," as suggested by the comment
to section 3-418. If that comment were not followed, the collecting
bank would have to try to pass its loss back to its customer, and
it would apparently have a right to do so by suing for breach of
transfer warranty under section 3-417(2)(b). 50 The customer would
thus be deprived of the immunity from liability which the customer
would have had if sued directly by the drawee bank. The applicability
of the shelter principle in this context was thus necessary to avoid
undercutting the finality principle of section 3-418.
Much the same problem could arise under revised section 3418, if the collecting bank took the instrument from a customer
who had acquired it in good faith and for value, but the bank did
not itself take the instrument for value. Would the shelter principle
protect the bank by giving it the same immunity to a restitutionary
claim of the drawee bank that its customer would have if the customer
were being sued by the drawee? That is more doubtful.
In the first place, it is not clear how much of the shelter
principle has survived the transition from the pre-1990 Official Text
to the present one. The section dealing with the effect of "transfer
of an instrument"'" says that a transfer "vests in the transferee any
48. Id. § 3-201(1). The rule had its exceptions: a transferee of a security interest
in an instrument acquired the transferor's rights only "to the extent of the interest
transferred," and "a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or
who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim [could not] improve his
position by taking from a later holder in due course." Id. § 3-201(1)-(2).
49. See supra note 47.

50. U.C.C. § 3-417(2) (1989) states: "Any person who transfers an instrument
and receives consideration warrants to his transferee ...
are genuine or authorized; . . .

51. U.C.C. § 3-203 (1990).

that .

.

. (b) all signatures

19931

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

right of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right
as a holder in due course," with one exception.5 2 A "person who

took the instrument in good faith and for value," thus qualifying
for protection under revised section 3-418(c), might not have a "right
to enforce the instrument," ' 3 so this "transfer" rule could be completely inoperative.

Even if the transferor had a right to enforce the instrument,
section 3-203(b) seems to be authority for his transferee's acquisition

of nothing more than that right.5 4 It apparently carries with it not
only standing to sue on the instrument but also such substantive
immunities from defenses as the transferor may have," but it is
difficult to read "right ...

to enforce the instrument" as extending

so far as to include an immunity which the transferor may have
from a restitution claim asserted by a bank which never assumed

an obligation on the instrument. 56
In addition, neither the text nor the comments to revised section
3-418 suggest that a transferor who accepted the instrument "in
good faith and for value" could transfer his immunity to another.
Indeed, the comments seem to preclude that possibility:
52. Id. § 3-203(b) (emphasis added). The exception is made in the case of a
transferee who engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument; such a
transferee cannot acquire the rights of a holder in due course. Id.
53. Id. § 3-301 defines "[pierson entitled to enforce an instrument" as meaning
"(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument
who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument
who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 3-309 or 3-418(d)."
Section 3-309 relates to cases involving lost, destroyed and stolen instruments.
Section 3-418(d) confers a right to enforce an instrument on a person who is
compelled to make restitution to a drawee or other payor who paid the instrument
by mistake. The person in the example who took the instrument in good faith and
for value might not fit any of these categories. Consequently, it seems that there
would be no transfer of rights at all under revised § 3-203.
54. Indeed, subsection (a) of revised § 3-203 defines transfer of an instrument
very narrowly: "An instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other
than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right
to enforce the instrument." U.C.C. § 3-203(a) (1990).
55. This is suggested by the specific reference to "holder in due course" in
the rule as to the effect of transfer of an instrument, "Transfer .

.

. vests in the

transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right
as a holder in due course .... ." Id. § 3-203(b) (emphasis added). It is further
suggested by a statement in the comments that, "Under subsection (b) a holder
in due course that transfers an instrument transfers those rights as a holder in due
course to the purchaser. The policy is to assure the holder in due course a free
market for the instrument." Id. § 3-203 cmt. 2. See also Id. § 3-203 cmt. 4, "Case
#1."
56. Henry J. Bailey and Richard B. Hagedorn appear to assume that the
"shelter" principle is carried over into the 1990 text of Article 3 without change,
although they do not address its specific application as discussed in the text of
this article. BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra note 31, at 7-46.
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If a check has been paid by mistake and the payee receiving
payment did not give value for the check or did not change
position in reliance on the payment, the drawee bank is entitled
to recover the amount of the check under subsection (a) regardless
7
of how the check was paid.
There is a possibility of finding such a transfer of immunity
by resort to common law. The comments to revised section 3-203
suggest that possibility. 5 They indicate that the broader rule as to
the effect of "transfer of an instrument" in the former version of
Article 3 was thought by the drafters of the revision too broad to
be reliable, and they emphasize the confinement of attention under
revised section 3-203 to the question of whether rights of enforcement
are passed to transferees and abstention from any attempt to deal
with whether transfers convey ownership of the instruments. "Ownership rights in instruments may be determined by principles of the
law of property, independent of Article 3, which do not depend on
whether the instrument was transferred under section 3-203."1 9 By
extension of this reasoning, the question of whether an immunity
enjoyed by one person passes to another as a result of some sort
of voluntary transaction between the two is outside the scope of
Article 3's rules and, in the absence of other applicable statutes, is
controlled by common law principles. 60 By this route the collecting
bank could be protected under revised section 3-418 and the purpose
of its subsection (c) effectuated.
It could also be argued that the underlying policy of subsection
(c) of section 3-418 would be undermined unless a transferee from
a taker in good faith and for value were given the same immunity
as the transferor, 6' so that a reading of the subsection to extend
protection to such a transferee is called for under section 1-102(1).62
The legitimacy of such a reading is debatable, however, in view of
the deletion from the comments to section 3-418 of any reference
to application of the shelter principle in this context.
57. U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 2 (1990). It must be conceded that the quoted comment
is not addressed to the question of the status of a transferee. Therefore, the wording
may not have been intended to be applicable to that question.
58. Id. § 3-203 cmt. 1.
59. Id.
60. Pre-Code cases applying the rule of Price v. Neal and extensions of its
principle would presumably be relevant precedents, but no reason is apparent why
courts could not frame an appropriate rule simply to advance the purpose of
revised § 3-418(c).
61. Cf. supra text accompanying note 49.
62. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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PAYOR BANK'S RIGHTS TO CHARGE CUSTOMER'S ACCOUNT

Revised section 4-401(a) continues, in slightly modified form,
the rule of former section 4-401(1), that a bank may charge against
its customer's account any item which is "properly payable," including an item which overdraws the account. 63 However, the revision
defines "properly payable," while its predecessor did not. Unfortunately, the definition is somewhat misleading.
"An item is properly payable if it is authorized by the customer
and is in accordance with any agreement between the customer and
the bank." 64 An "item" would presumably be "authorized by the
customer" if the customer had signed it, even though the item was
drawn payable to the order of a specified person and the item bore
the forged signature of the payee. If the bank paid the item, section
4-401(a), taken literally, would authorize the bank to charge the
payment to the customer's account.
Such a result would be contrary to prior law, 65 and the comments
to the revision indicate that it would be contrary to the drafters'
intention as well. A comment states that "[a]n item is properly
payable from a customer's account if the customer has authorized
the payment and the payment does not violate any agreement that
may exist between the bank and its customer ....
An item containing
a forged drawer's signature or forged indorsement is not properly
payable." 66 The comment thus contains a more accurate statement
of the intended rule than does the statute itself: an "item" is
"properly payable" if the payment has been authorized by the
customer, i.e., if it is the customer's genuine order and the payment
is in accordance with the terms of the order, and if the payment
is in accordance with any agreement between the bank and the
customer; it is not enough, however, for only the item to be authorized by the customer and in accord with any agreement between
bank and customer.
63. U.C.C. § 4-401(1) (1989) states: "As against its customer, a bank may charge
against his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account
even though the charge creates an overdraft." U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990) states: "A
bank may charge against the account of a customer an item that is properly payable
from the account even though the charge creates an overdraft."

64. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990).
65. See, e.g., BARKLEY CLARK, THE

LAW

OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS

AND

CARDS 8-71 (3d ed. 1990). "Since the forged indorsement is wholly inoperative under § 3-404, the bank has failed to follow the customer's directive to
pay to the order of the intended payee .... Therefore, the drawee bank must
recredit the [customer's] account for the full amount of the 'improperly payable'
CREDIT

item under § 4-401(1)." Id. (The Code references are to the pre-revision versions
of Articles 3 and 4.)
66. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (1990).
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INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE OF OUTSIDE
AGREEMENT

Assume that a time note, otherwise negotiable, made by A and
issued to B as payee, states that the maker's promise is subject to
the terms of an oral agreement made between A and B contemporaneously with the issuance of the note, but the note does not
reveal the terms of the oral agreement. Assume further that the oral
agreement includes a term that A need not pay the note until he
succeeds in selling his farm Blackacre. Is this note negotiable? What
is the effect of the oral agreement?
As to negotiability, the most nearly applicable provision in
revised Article 3 is that of section 3-106(a), dealing with when a
promise or order is to be treated as unconditional for purposes of
section 3-104(a). Section 3-104(a) defines negotiable instrument as
"an unconditional promise or order" having certain additional characteristics. 67 The rule stated is that, except as otherwise provided in
the same section, "a promise or order is unconditional unless it
states (i) an express condition to payment, (ii) that the promise or
order is subject to or governed by another writing, or (iii) that rights
or obligations with respect to the promise or order are stated in
another writing. ' 6 Since the hypothetical note states no condition
to payment and refers to no other writing, and the section contains
no other pertinent rule, it appears clear that the note is to be treated
as unconditional for purposes of negotiability. 69 This is a change in
the law, for the prior version of Article 3 treated as "not unconditional," and as non-negotiable, an instrument which "states that
it is subject to or governed by any other agreement.' '70
67. Id. § 3-104(a).
68. Id. § 3-106(a).
69. It is not possible to reason here that the Code is silent on the question of
whether incorporation by reference of the terms of an oral agreement renders it
"conditional" and thus non-negotiable, since revised § 3-106(a) affirmatively declares
that, "a promise or order is unconditional unless" it contains one of the types of
provisions there specified or another rule of the same section would treat it as
conditional, and nothing in the section can be read as referring to this type of
provision as making a promise or order conditional. U.C.C. § 3-106(a) (1990)
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, Henry J. Bailey and Richard B. Hagedorn assert
that, "An instrument clearly is conditional and nonnegotiable if it is made expressly
subject to or governed by another agreement or writing." BAILEY & HAGEDORN,
supra note 31, at 2-7. (emphasis added) (citing § 3-105(2)(a) of the former version
of Article 3 and § 3-106(a) of the revision.)
70. U.C.C. § 3-105(2)(a) (1989) provided that, "A promise or order is not
unconditional if the instrument (a) states that it is subject to or governed by any
other agreement," and U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b) (1989) required that a writing "to be
a negotiable instrument within this Article ... contain an unconditional promise
or order ......
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The oral agreement might destroy negotiability by rendering the
time of payment of the instrument indefinite. 7' However, it may be
that its terms are not to be considered in judging the negotiability
of the note. The traditional rule has been that the negotiability of
72
a writing is to be determined by inspection of the writing alone,
the so-called "four-corners" rule. 73 It is unclear what has happened
to this doctrine under revised Article 3. The forthright statement of
it 7 4 has disappeared from the official comments, 75 along with a
statutory rule which was derived from

it.76

Still, the rule is not

expressly repudiated in either the text or the comments, the requirements for negotiability are stated in language not inconsistent
with it, and at least one comment can be thought to give the doctrine
oblique recognition.

77

If it be assumed that the note is negotiable, the effect of the
oral agreement on the enforceability of the note when it gets into
71. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(2) (1990) requires that a negotiable instrument be "payable
on demand or at a definite time," and the oral agreement seems to render the
note not payable on demand, yet very indefinite as to when it will be payable.
72. U.C.C. § 3-119 cmt. 5 (1989) states: "The negotiability of an instrument
is always to be determined by what appears on the face of the instrument alone ... "
See also BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra note 31, at 2-3. "Negotiability must be
determined solely by what is written on the face of the instrument itself. As was
said in one well-known early American case: 'A negotiable bill or note is a courier
without luggage.' " Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 45 Am. Dec. 645 (1846) (Gibson,
C.J.).
73. See M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification of Negotiable Instruments Law: A Tale
of Reiterated Anachronism, 21 U. TOLEDO L. Rv. 625, 630 n.21 (1990). See also
WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES,
§ 3-104:06 (Art. 3) (1984) (stating "Negotiability is determined solely by reference
to the four corners of the instrument.").
74. See supra note 72.
75. This is a fact of some significance in view of public statements made by
the drafters of revised Article 3 that the comments to the revision carry forward,
at least in substance, all previous comments considered relevant to the revision.
See supra text accompanying note 8.
76. U.C.C. § 3-119(2) (1989) states: "A separate agreement does not affect the
negotiability of an instrument." The comment quoted in note 72 was made with
reference to this subsection.
77. Section 3-106(a) treats a promise or order stating that the note subject to
or governed by another writing or that the rights or obligations are stated in
another writing as conditional. The comment states that "[it is not relevant whether
any condition to payment is or is not stated in the writing to which reference is
made. The rationale is that the holder of a negotiable instrument should not be
required to examine another document to determine rights with respect to payment."
U.C.C. § 3-106 cmt. 1 (1990). Some writers on revised Article 3 appear to assume
that the four-corners rule has survived the transition intact. See Milton Copeland,
A Statutory Primer: Revised Article 3 of the U.C.C. - Negotiable Instruments,
67 ARK. L. NOTES 67, at n.35 (1992); BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra note 31, at 23.
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the hands of a holder in due course presents a problem. 7 If C were
to acquire A's note as a holder in due course, the maturity date
specified in the note not yet having arrived, and A was unable to
sell Blackacre by the maturity date, would C be able to enforce the
note against A despite the oral agreement? Could it not be argued
that the defense is a "personal ' 79 one,80 and so C is immune to it,
78. As between the original parties to the note, the oral agreement should be
controlling. Revised § 3-117 provides:
Subject to applicable law regarding exclusion of proof of contemporaneous or previous agreements, the obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be modified, supplemented, or nullified
by a separate agreement of the obligor and a person entitled to enforce
the instrument, if the instrument is issued or the obligation is incurred in
reliance on the agreement or as part of the same transaction giving rise
to the agreement. To the extent an obligation is modified, supplemented
or nullified by an agreement under this section, the agreement is a defense
to the obligation.
U.C.C. § 3-117 (1990). This rule is not limited to separate written agreements. The
parol evidence rule should not affect the case posed; since the text of the note
incorporates the oral agreement by reference, evidence of the oral agreement would
be consistent with the terms of the note.
The oral agreement would also be controlling in any case where a subsequent
transferee was not a holder in due course and did not derive his rights from a
holder in due course who would be immune to a defense based on the oral
agreement. Section 3-305(a) of revised Article 3 declares that, as a general rule,
"the right to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject to
...(2) a defense of the obligor stated in another section of this Article .... .
U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(2) (1990). Subsection (b) of the same section makes an exception
in favor of "a holder in due course." Id. § 3-305(b).
If B himself were a holder in due course, he would presumably be subject to
the terms of the oral agreement. Revised § 3-305(b) omits the language that appeared
in the former version of the section which immunized a holder in due course only
from defenses set up by "a party to the instrument with whom the holder has
not dealt." U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (1989). The revision, however, states that a holder
in due course is "not subject to defenses of the obligor .

.

. against a person other

than the holder," seemingly implying that if a defense arises from dealings between
the obligor and the holder in due course, the latter is subject to the defense.
U.C.C. § 3-305(b). The official comment to revised § 3-305 indicates that the intent
is to limit holder in due course immunities to cases where the defenses in question
arise from dealings between the obligor and a third party. U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2
(1990). See generally Milton Copeland, A Statutory Primer: Revised Article 3 of
the U.C.C. - Negotiable Instruments, ARK. L. NoTEs 68 at n.46 (1992).
79. The term "personal" refers to a defense to which a holder in due course
may be immune. See supra note 18.
80. Revised § 3-305(a), laying down general rules as to defenses to which persons
suing on negotiable instruments are subject, specifies several defenses in paragraph
(1), then, in paragraph (2), refers to "a defense of the obligor stated in another
section of this Article or a defense of the obligor that would be available if the
person entitled to enforce the instrument were enforcing a right to payment under
a simple contract." U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1) - (2) (1990). Subsection (b) of the same
section provides: "The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation
of a party to pay the instrument is subject to defenses of the obligor stated in
subsection (a)(l), but is not subject to defenses of the obligor stated in subsection
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despite the fact that the note he holds expressly states that it is
subject to the terms of the oral agreement? What would be the
policy justification for that result?
A possible response to the argument is that C could not be a
holder in due course of this note, nor could anyone else, since it
carries notice of a defense on its face. To be a holder in due course
one must have taken the instrument "without notice that any party
has a defense . . . described in section 3-305(a)."'11 Surely C would
have taken the note with notice of the existence of the oral agreement

since the note expressly referred to

it.2

It can further be argued

that C took with notice of the terms of the oral agreement, whether
he actually knew them or not, since the note expressly subordinated
its terms to those of the oral agreement. 3 If he did, it can be
reasoned that he would have notice of a defense since revised section
3-117 provides: "To the extent an obligation is modified, supplemented, or nullified by [a separate] agreement ... the agreement
is a defense to the obligation." 4
That reasoning seems weak, however. Section 3-302(a) requires
that a holder in due course have taken the instrument without notice
that any party to it has a defense. 5 There is surely a difference
between notice that a person has a defense and notice that a person
may have a defense, and there is an even greater difference between
notice that a person has a defense and notice that a person may
acquire a defense in the future. In the hypothetical case posed, C
would have reason to know, at most, that A might acquire a defense
(a)(2) .

. . ."

Id. § 3-305(b). (The defenses listed in (2) of subsection (a) would thus

be "personal defenses"). A's defense based on his oral agreement with B cannot
be fitted into paragraph (1), which lists only infancy, duress, lack of legal capacity,
illegality, fraud and discharge in insolvency proceedings, so it must be a "personal
defense."
81. Id. § 3-302(a)(2)(vi).
82. "Notice" is defined in Article 1 of the code as follows: "A person has
'notice' of a fact when (a) he has actual knowledge of it; or (b) he has received
a notice or notification of it; or (c) from all the facts and circumstances known
to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists." Id. § 1201(25). (This definition was not changed by the 1990 changes in the official text.)
While "reason to know" is not defined, it is hard to imagine any reasonable
meaning that would not treat a purchaser of a negotiable instrument to whom the
instrument is delivered as having "reason to know" of what appears on its face.
83. This conclusion requires an extension of the "reason to know" concept,
but this extension seems well within rational bounds.
84. U.C.C. § 3-117 (1990); see supra note 78 for the full text of § 3-117.
85. See supra text accompanying note 81. This is a change from the ambiguous
version of the prior text, which provided that in order for a holder to be a holder
in due course, the holder had to take the instrument "without notice . . . of any

defense against .. .it on the part of any person." U.C.C. § 3-302(l)(c) (1989).
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in the future if it turns out that A has been unable to sell Blackacre
by the note's maturity date. As to section 3-117, the rule stated
there does not treat the oral agreement as a defense except "[t o
the extent [the obligation on the instrument] is modified, supplemented or nullified by [the] agreement." ' 86 It would be a sensible
reading of that language to treat it as meaning that if the outside
agreement would give the obligor a defense, the obligor has, to the
same extent, a defense to the obligation on the instrument.
There is, on the other hand, one basis for reading section 3117 as treating notice of the possibility of a defense arising from
an outside agreement as such notice of a defense as would prevent
a purchaser of the instrument from becoming a holder in due course.
In the pre-1990 text of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was
expressly provided that "[knowledge of the following facts does
not of itself give the purchaser notice of a defense or claim ...
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise
or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has
notice that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms thereof.... "87
That language made it quite clear that it was only notice of an
existing defense that would prevent a taker of an instrument from
becoming a holder in due course, and the point was underlined by
a comment to the same effect. 88 No similar rule appears in the 1990
Official Text, nor is there any similar comment. Was a change in
the law intended? The comments do not say. Arguably, the point
is now covered in the clearer language of section 3-302(a)(2)(vi), 89
and no change in the law has been made.
However, if C can be a holder in due course, then it would
seem that he can claim immunity from A's defense, despite the
explicit provision in the note making it subject to the terms of the
oral agreement, and that does not make much sense. The answer,
in principle, should be that the note is not negotiable, and for that
reason there can be no holder in due course. One could argue that
the underlying policy of revised section 3-106 calls for reading subsection (a) as if it read "another writing or agreement," but the
fact that the rule now mandates a finding that a promise or order
is unconditional unless it contains language of a type specified in
the section appears to preclude a reading that is completely contrary
to its express provisions. It is likely that courts encountering the
problem will simply ignore the statutory wording to reach a satis86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra note 78.
U.C.C. § 3-304(4)(b) (1989).
Id. § 3-304 cmt. 9.
See supra text accompanying note 85.
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factory result, but it is unfortunate that such manhandling of the
statute should be necessary.
VII.

A TRANSFEROR'S WARRANTY OF TITLE

In the pre-1990 versions of Articles 3 and 4, a person who
transferred an instrument for consideration was usually treated as
warranting to the transferee, and sometimes to subsequent transferees, that the transferor had a "good title" to the paper or
represented one who had good title, and that the transfer was
"otherwise rightful." 9 Both articles also provided for a similar, but
not identical, warranty given to a person to whom an instrument
was presented for payment or acceptance by the person obtaining
payment or acceptance and prior transferors. This was a warranty
that the warrantor had a good title to the instrument or represented
one who had good title, but it did not include language comparable
to the "otherwise rightful" portion of a transferor's warranty. 91
That was a substantial difference. The "presentment warranty"
was little more than a warranty that all indorsements necessary to
the presenter's status as holder of the instrument (or to his principal's
status as holder if the presenter was representing another) were on
90. U.C.C. § 3-417(2) (1989) provided:
Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration warrants
to his transferee and if the transfer is by indorsement to any subsequent
holder who takes the instrument in good faith that . . .(a) he has a good
title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance
on behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is otherwise
rightful ....
An identical warranty was given under § 4-207(2), which provided that when a
"customer and collecting bank . . . transfers an item and receives a settlement or
other consideration for it," the warranty runs to the immediate transferee "and
to any subsequent collecting bank who takes the item in good faith." Id. § 4207(2). Both warranty provisions could apply to the same fact situation, although
the two rules differed in several regards: (1) the types of paper to which they
applied; (2) who gave the warranty; and (3) to whom the warranty ran. These
differences are of little significance in relation to the problem discussed in the text
of this article.
91. U.C.C. § 3-417(l)(a) (1989) stated: "Any person who obtains payment or
acceptance and any prior transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays
or accepts that . . .he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title .... ." Article 4
provided for an identical warranty, given by "[elach customer or collecting bank
who obtains payment or acceptance of an item and each prior customer and
collecting bank" to "the payor bank or other payor who in good faith pays or
accepts the item." Id. § 4-207(l)(a). As in the case of the transfer warranty, the
differences in the scope of the two rules as to presentment warranties are of little
significance for purposes of this article. See supra note 90.
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the instrument and genuine.9 2 The "transfer warranty" went considerably further than that. The warrantor's assurance that the transfer was otherwise rightful amounted to a warranty that the instrument
was not subject to any adverse property claim which was good
against the transferor.93
The 1990 versions of Articles 3 and 4 also make provisions for
warranties accompanying transfers of instruments and warranties
running to persons who pay or accept instruments, but these warranties do not refer to good title or rightful transfer. The nearest
equivalent in the 1990 official text is a warranty that the warrantor
is, or was, "a person entitled to enforce the instrument" or a
92. See U.C.C. § 3-417 cmt. 3 (1989), which states: "Subsection (l)(a) retains
the generally accepted rule that the party who accepts or pays does not 'admit'
the genuineness of indorsements and may recover from the person presenting the
instrument when they turn out to be forged." See, e.g., Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v.
United California Bank, 582 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1978) (holding that warranty of good
title is not a warranty of delivery and permits very limited inquiry into whether
the instrument contains all necessary indorsements and whether they are genuine
or otherwise effective). See also JAMES J. WrTE & ROBERT S.
COMMERCIAL CODE

SUMMERS, UNIFORM

§ 15-9 at n.4 (3rd ed. 1988) (commenting on § 4-207(l)(a): "In

nine-tenths of the cases that lawyers will see, 'good title' will mean no more than:
'this check bears no forged indorsements.' "). See also BRADFORD STONE, UN4FORM
COMMERCIAL CODE IN A NUTSHELL 301 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing the drawee's recourse
against the presenter after payment of a check bearing a forged indorsement).
The rationale of this restricted concept of "good title" is that since a person
obligated on a negotiable instrument can discharge the obligation by paying the
holder, even if the holder does not have a perfect title to the instrument, and a
drawee bank is entitled to charge the drawer's account with a payment made to
a holder, even if the holder is not the owner of the instrument, a person paying
an instrument needs protection only against the possibility that an apparent holder
is not a real holder because one or more indorsements necessary to his status as
"holder" are forged or unauthorized. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES

§ 3-417:06 (1984).

93. In some cases, however, the warranty is broken even though the transferor is actually the holder. Thus, an instrument that is payable to .*ca..
or to the order of the transferor might have been found or stolen by him
or acquired by him as agent and transferred without authority of the
owner. In cases of this kind, although the transferor is a holder because
the instrument runs to him, he breaks the warranty of title because he is
not the owner and does not have authority from the owner.
CHARLES M. WEBER & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, COMMERCIAL PAPER IN A NUTSHELL
211 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing § 3-417(2)(a)). The warranty of rightful transfer is
breached by "transfer of a stolen instrument payable to bearer, transfer by a

trustee in violation of his trust, and transfer by a holder of an instrument which
is subject to an equitable claim of a previous owner." Hawkland & Lawrence,
supra note 92, § 3-417-13.
The rationale of this broader warranty was, presumably, that purchasers of
instruments need greater protection than payors. Purchasers may be injured if
instruments they have paid for are taken away from them by third parties with
superior property rights, and purchasers are not protected merely because they have
dealt with holders.
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representative of such a person, and transferors give no broader
warranties than presenters do. 94 The comments to the new text
94. Warranties given by transferors are set forth in §§ 3-416(a) and 4-207(a).
U.C.C. § 3-416(a) (1990) states: "A person who transfers an instrument for consideration warrants to the transferee and, if the transfer is by indorsement, to any
subsequent transferee that: (1) the warrantor is a person entitled to enforce the
instrument ....

."

U.C.C. § 4-207(a) states: "A customer or collecting bank that

transfers an item and receives a settlement or other consideration warrants to the
transferee and to any subsequent collecting bank that: (1) the warrantor is a person
entitled to enforce the item ....

.

The provisions as to the warranties given to persons paying or accepting instruments are more numerous and are dealt with in §§ 3-417 and 4-208. In each
section there are separate subsections dealing with presentments to drawees of
unaccepted drafts, either for acceptance or for payment, and other presentments
for payment. In all of them, however, the warranty given is that the warrantor
is, or was when the warrantor transferred the instrument, "a person entitled to
enforce the instrument or authorized to obtain payment [or acceptance, in a case
of presentment for acceptance] on behalf of a person entitled to enforce the
instrument." Those provisions read as follows:
If an unaccepted draft is presented to the drawee for payment or acceptance
and the drawee pays or accepts the draft, (i) the person obtaining payment
or acceptance, at the time of presentment, and (ii) a previous transferor
of the draft, at the time of transfer, warrant to the drawee making payment
or accepting the draft in good faith that: (1) the warrantor is, or was,
at the time the warrantor transferred the draft, a person entitled to enforce
the draft or authorized to obtain payment or acceptance of the draft on
behalf of a person entitled to enforce the draft ....
U.C.C. § 3-417(a) (1990).
If (i) a dishonored draft is presented for payment to the drawer or an
indorser or (ii) any other instrument is presented for payment to a party
obliged to pay the instrument, and (iii) payment is received, the following
rules apply: (1) The person obtaining payment and a prior transferor of
the instrument warrant to the person making payment in good faith that
the warrantor is, or was, at the time the warrantor transferred the instrument, a person entitled to enforce the instrument or authorized to
obtain payment on behalf of a person entitled to enforce the instrument.

...

Id. § 3-417(d).
If an unaccepted draft is presented to the drawee for payment or acceptance
and the drawee pays or accepts the draft, (i) the person obtaining payment
or acceptance, at the time of presentment, and (ii) a previous transferor
of the draft, at the time of transfer, warrant to the drawee that pays or
accepts the draft in good faith that: (1) the warrantor is, or was, at the
time the warrantor transferred the draft, a person entitled to enforce the
draft or authorized to obtain payment or acceptance of the draft on behalf
of a person entitled to enforce the draft ....
Id. § 4-208(a).
If (i) a dishonored draft is presented for payment to the drawer or an
indorser or (ii) any other item is presented for payment to a party obliged
to pay the item, and the item is paid, the person obtaining payment and
a prior transferor of the item warrant to the person making payment in
good faith that the warrantor is, or was, at the time the warrantor
transferred the item, a person entitled to enforce the item or authorized
to obtain payment on behalf of a person entitled to enforce the item ....
Id. § 4-208(d).
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describe the warranty as being, in effect, a warranty against unauthorized or missing indorsements. 9s
Understanding why that is so requires understanding of the
phrase "person entitled to enforce" an instrument, a term of art
in the 1990 Official Text. It is defined as follows: " 'Person entitled
to enforce' an instrument means (i) the holder of the instrument,
(ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights
of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument
who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 3-309
or 3-418(d)." 96 The central idea of this concept is "holder." 97 With
the possible exception of a person whose right to enforce the instrument is conferred by section 3-418(d), 9s a person entitled to
enforce an instrument refers to a holder of the instrument," a
successor to a holder's rights by transfer or operation of law,' °° or
95. U.C.C. § 3-416 cmt. 2 (1990). See also id. § 3-417 cmt. 2 (stating that
"[s]ubsection (a)(1) in effect is a warranty that there are no unauthorized or missing
indorsements"); id. § 4-207 cmt. (stating that "[e]xcept for subsection (b), this
section conforms to section 3-416 and extends its coverage to items"); id. § 4-208
cmt. (stating that "[t]his section conforms to section 3-417 and extends its coverage
to items.'").
96. U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990).
97. To be the "holder" of an instrument, one must be "in possession" of the
instrument and the instrument must be "payable to bearer or, in the case of an
instrument payable to an identified Person," payable to the person in possession.
Id. § 1-201(20). If an instrument, as originally drawn or as subsequently indorsed,
is payable to an identified person, no one else can become the holder of the
instrument without the indorsement of the identified person. Id. § 3-205(a). Although
the indorsement may be made by an agent, an "unauthorized signature is ineffective"
as the signature of the person whose signature it purports to be. Id. §§ 3-402 and
403(a).
98. U.C.C. § 3-418(d) (1990) states:
Notwithstanding section 4-215, if an instrument is paid or accepted by
mistake and the payor or acceptor recovers payment or revokes acceptance

under subsection (a) or (b), the instrument is deemed not to have been
paid or accepted and is treated as dishonored, and the person from whom
payment is recovered has rights as a person entitled to enforce the dishonored instrument.
Subsections (a) and (b) of § 3-418 deal with possibilities of restitutionary recovery
of payments made under mistake of fact and avoidance of acceptances made under
mistake of fact. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. In most instances, this
rule probably operates simply to reinstate the "holder" status which the person
required to repay had before obtaining payment, although it could apparently confer
a right to enforce the instrument on one who was never a holder.
99. U.C.C. § 3-301(i) (1990).
100. Id. § 3-301(ii). The comment explains that "[a] nonholder in possession of
an instrument includes a person that acquired rights of a holder by subrogation
or under section 3-203(a) [i.e., by transfer of the instrument]. It also includes any
other person who under applicable law is a successor to the holder or otherwise
acquires the holder's rights." Id. § 3-301 cmt.
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a former holder or successor to a holder who has lost possession
of the instrument by accident or theft.' 0 '
In cases of presentment of instruments for payment, a warranty
that the person obtaining payment is a person entitled to enforce
the instrument probably provides the payor with as much protection
against defects in title as the payor needs. Under section 3-602, a
person obligated on a negotiable instrument can discharge the obligation by making payment to a "person entitled to enforce the
instrument," and that is true even if the payor is aware that some
third party claims a better right to the instrument or its proceeds
than the holder has. 3 2 Furthermore, a drawee of an unaccepted
check can usually discharge its obligation to the drawer by paying
the holder even if the holder does not have good title to the
instrument, at least if the drawee acts in good faith and without

negligence. 103
101. Section 3-301(iii) refers to "a person not in possession of an instrument
who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 3-309 .

. . ."

This

section permits such a person to enforce the instrument, subject to special requirements of proof and security against adverse claims.
102. See U.C.C. § 3-602(a) (1990):
Subject to subsection (b), an instrument is paid to the extent payment is
made (i) by or on behalf of a party obliged to pay the instrument, and
(ii) to a person entitled to enforce the instrument. To the extent of the
payment, the obligation of the party obliged to pay the instrument is
discharged even though payment is made with knowledge of a claim to
the instrument under section 3-306 by another person.
Subsection (b) excepts from this discharge rule cases where a rival claimant has,
to the knowledge of the payor, obtained a court order prohibiting payment; the
payor of an instrument other than a cashier's, teller's or certified check has accepted
from a rival claimant an indemnity against loss resulting from refusal to pay the
person entitled to enforce the instrument; or the person making payment knows
that the instrument has been stolen and knows the person obtaining payment is
in wrongful possession. Id. § 3-602(b).
103. At least that has been the law, despite the fact that the Uniform Commercial
Code did not expressly so provide. See supra note 31, Bailey and Hagedorn at
16-45 to -46. The Code provisions dealing with a payor bank's right to charge its
customer's account with payments made in accordance with the customer's orders
have usually been cited as the principal authority for the doctrine. Presumably,
the 1990 revisions do not prescribe a different rule. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990) provides
that,
A bank may charge against the account of a customer an item that is
properly payable from the account even though the charge creates an
overdraft. An item is properly payable if it is authorized by the customer
and is in accordance with any agreement between the customer and bank.
A comment defines "properly payable" as follows: "[ain item is properly payable
from a customer's account if the customer has authorized the payment and the
payment does not violate any agreement that may exist between the bank and its
customer.... An item containing a forged drawer's signature or forged indorsement
is not properly payable ... ." Id. § 4-401 cmt. 1.An obligation of the bank to

act in good faith is probably imposed by § 1-203: "Every contract or duty within
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Moreover, the crucial element of the warranty that the presenter
is a person entitled to enforce the instrument is the assurance that
the instrument bears genuine indorsements of all persons whose
indorsements are necessary to the presenter's status as one entitled
to enforce the instrument. It is probable that, in the great majority
of cases, persons asked to pay instruments will not do so unless
the persons asking for payment appear to be holders, and the main
need of a payor in that situation is for assurance of the authenticity
of indorsements appearing on the instrument which are essential to
the presenter's "holder" status. Thus, the warranty boils down to
one of the genuineness of indorsements, '° and a presenter's warranty
of entitlement to enforce the instrument differs very little from the
presenter's warranty of good title of the prior versions of Articles
3 and 4.105

Limiting the transferor's warranty relating to title to a warranty
that the transferor is a person entitled to enforce the instrument,
on the other hand, represents a change in the law, and it is a change
of dubious merit. A person buying an instrument or taking it as
security for a debt will have a legitimate desire for protection against
the possibility of having the instrument, or its proceeds, taken away
from him by a person who has a property interest in the instrument
which is superior to that of the transferor. A warranty that the
transferor has a right to enforce the instrument does not satisfy
that need for protection, for an assurance that the transferor is a
holder or has the rights of one is not an assurance that there is
no third person with a superior claim to the instrument.'0 6 If the
transferee becomes a holder in due course the problem disappears,
because a holder in due course takes the instrument free of adverse
claims.' 0 7 However, if the transferee does not become a holder in
this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforceient."
Additionally, case law prior to the 1990 revisions of Articles 3 and 4 imposed a
duty of ordinary care on drawee banks in paying checks. See BARKLEY CLARK,
THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 2-13 et seq. (3d
ed. 1990). The 1990 Official Text does not appear to relieve the banks of such
duty.
104. See supra text accompanying note 95.
105. See supra text accompanying note 92.
106. This is underscored by a provision in revised Article 3 that "[a] person
may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not
the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument."
U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990).
107. Id. § 3-306. Section 3-306 states:
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a
holder in due course, is subject to a claim of property or possessory right
in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation
and to recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having rights of
a holder in due course takes free of the claim to the instrument.
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due course, there is no such immunity.'0 8 One who is not a holder
in due course may, nevertheless, be a good faith purchaser who
stands to suffer loss if deprived of the instrument or its proceeds,
and arguably the law should protect such a purchaser by giving him
recourse against his transferor if it turns out that the title conveyed
was defective. The pre-1990 Official Text did provide such protection,
with its warranty that transfer was otherwise rightful,'0 9 but there
is no equivalent in the revision."10
Consider, for example, the case of a person who buys an
instrument from a holder, promising to pay the agreed price at a
later time. Assume that before the buyer has paid any part of the
price, a third party asserts a claim to the instrument which turns
out to be a valid claim. The buyer is not immune from that claim
as a holder in due course because the executory promise given to
the seller is not value."' Assume, further, that the seller was not
a holder in due course either and had no immunity to the claim.
The buyer must, therefore, give up the instrument to its owner.
What recourse does he have against his seller? He has none, judging
from the 1990 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Under the former version of Article 3, the buyer would have
been able to rescind his promise of payment as a remedy for the
seller's breach of warranty that the transfer was rightful." 2 The
buyer might even have had an additional right to recover the value
of the bargain as damages for breach of the warranty." 3 Under the
108. Id.
109. See supra text at note 93.
110. Bailey and Hagedorn assert that the warranties given by transferors under
the 1990 Official Text "are substantially those of the 1962 UCC that ...

the

warrantor is entitled to enforce the instrument, or has good title or authority to
obtain payment or acceptance, and the transfer is otherwise rightful. . .

."

See

supra note 31, at 7-60. However, Bailey and Hagedorn do not explain how they
reach that conclusion.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
112. A comment to former § 3-417 stated: "Warranty terms .

.

. are used with

the intention of bringing in all the usual rules of law applicable to warranties, and
in particular .

.

. the availability of all remedies for breach of warranty, such as

rescission of the transaction or an action for damages." U.C.C. § 3-417 cmt. 1
(1989). Moreover, the buyer in the hypothetical case posed would have received a
warranty that "transfer is .

.

. rightful," because the warranty was given by anyone

who transferred an instrument and received "consideration," not "value." Id. § 3417(2)(a).
113. The comment to former § 3-417, which is quoted above in note 112, suggests
that rescission and damages would be alternative remedies, but the comment also
refers to "the usual rules of law applicable to warranties." If Article 2 is consulted
for the "usual rules," it would allow a buyer, in circumstances comparable to
this, to cancel his obligation to perform his own promise and have damages against
his seller for breach of warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-711 (1990). Article 2 was not
modified by the 1990 amendments of the Official Text.
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1990 Official Text, it is not apparent that the buyer has any legal
excuse for failing to pay the agreed price, let alone a claim for
4
damages against the seller."
The comments to the 1990 text offer as a reason for the change
only that the more restricted warranty given by transferors conforms
to the narrower definition of transfer adopted by the 1990 text. 1 5
That falls short of explaining why the restriction of the warranty
was considered sound policy.
Perhaps the intention of the drafters was to leave it to the
courts to determine whether and in what circumstances transferors
should be considered to give broader warranties of title than those
for which the Uniform Commercial Code provides or to find other
ways to protect disappointed purchasers against harm from title
defects." 6 The adoption of the narrow definition of transfer in the
1990 Official Text appears to have been motivated by a desire to
leave questions of property rights, other than rights to enforce
114. Another illustration of the impact of the change in the title warranty given
by transferors would be a case similar in all respects to the hypothetical case posed
above supra in the text accompanying note 111 except that the buyer has actually
paid the agreed price before learning of an adverse claim, but the buyer is not a
holder in due course because the buyer purchased the instrument with notice that
it was overdue. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2)(iii) (1990) (stating that " 'holder in due
course' means the holder of an instrument if: ....the holder took the instrument
...without notice that the instrument is overdue . . ."). Even though the buyer

would have no immunity to the adverse property claim, the buyer unquestionably
suffers a net loss unless the loss can be shifted to the seller of the instrument,
and if the buyer made the purchase in good faith, justice would be promoted by
allowing such recourse. The prior version of Article 3 would have protected the
buyer by raising a warranty of rightful transfer running from the seller, but the
1990 Official Text would not. The change in the law is especially ironic in view
of the fact that, in some other parts of Article 3, rules which formerly protected
only holders in due course now protect persons taking instruments in good faith
and for value. Compare U.C.C. § 3-407(3) (1989) with U.C.C. § 3-407(c) (1990);
compare U.C.C. § 3-418 (1989) with U.C.C. § 3-418(c) (1990).
115. U.C.C. § 3-416 cmt. 2 (1990) states: "Since the purpose of transfer (Section
3-203(a)) is to give the transferee the right to enforce the instrument, subsection
(a)(l) is a warranty that the transferor is a person entitled to enforce the instrument
(Section 3-301)." "Transfer" is defined in the revision as follows: "An instrument
is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose
of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument." Id.
§ 3-203(a).
116. In the hypothetical case posed in the text above at note 111, the common
law concept of "failure of consideration" might be deemed to excuse the purchaser
of the instrument from the executory obligation, though finding a common law
basis for allowing the purchaser damages for loss of bargain would be more difficult.
In the case supposed in note 114, it may be that restitutionary principles could
be invoked to enable the purchaser to recover the payment made, but there remains
the question of whether the purchaser did not assume the risk of defects in title.
If the courts found that not to be so, they would, in effect, be reinventing the
warranty of rightful transfer.

19931

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

instruments, to non-code law."17 It may be that the intent was to
leave the consequences of defective titles to non-code law as well.
If that is the intended message, it does not emerge clearly, and
courts may well reason that since the revised version of the warranty
sections drops the distinction between the scope of a transfer warranty
and that of a presentment warranty that appeared in the pre-1990
text, the code implies that a transferor's responsibilities relating to
title can go no further than the warranty of entitlement to enforce
the instrument.118
VIII.

VALUE REVISITED

The abolition of the warranty of rightful transfer discussed
above" 9 has a worrisome side-effect. Under both versions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, an executory promise is not treated as
value for purposes of due course holding.120 The comment to former
section 3-303 explained that,
[tihe underlying reason of policy is that when the purchaser learns
of a defense against the instrument or of a defect in the title
he is not required to enforce the instrument, but is free to rescind
the transaction for breach of the transferor's warranty (section
3-417). There is thus not the same necessity for giving him the
status of a holder in due course, cutting off claims and defenses,
2
as where he has actually paid value.' '
In other words, if the purchaser found that the instrument was
unenforceable or that another person had a superior claim to it and
117. The comments to revised § 3-203 explain that the former section dealing
with transfers was "confusing," apparently because it attempted to deal with the
subject too comprehensively and fell into error in doing so. The solution adopted
by the revision was to abstain from dealing with any aspect of transfer except that
of its effect on the right to enforce the instrument.
Although transfer of an instrument might mean in a particular case that
title to the instrument passes to the transferee, that result does not follow
in all cases. The right to enforce an instrument and ownership of the
instrument are two different concepts ....

Ownership rights in instruments

may be determined by principles of the law of property, independent of
Article 3, which do not depend on whether the instrument was transferred
under Section 3-203.
U.C.C. § 3-203 cmt. 1 (1990).
118. Section 1-102(1), with its mandate to construe and apply the code so as to
give effect to its underlying purposes and policies, is likely to be of little help with
this problem as no purpose or policy to provide broader protection against title
defects than the transfer warranties expressly stated is evident from either the text
or comments of the revision.
119. Supra text accompanying notes 90-118.
120. See U.C.C. § 3-303(a) (1989); U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(1) (1990).
121. U.C.C. § 3-303 cmt. 3 (1989).
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the purchaser had not yet performed the promise to give value, the
purchaser could simply call off the deal with the transferor and thus
be left no worse off than before taking the instrument. The justification for rescission of that transaction was that the transferor
would have breached a transfer warranty in any such case, 122 and
123
rescission was one of the remedies for such breach.
The explanation offered by the comments to the 1990 revision
of Article 3 for the rule that an executory promise is not value is
different. It is asserted, much as in the comment to the earlier
version, that "the policy basis [for the rule] is that the holder who
gives an executory promise of performance will not suffer an outof-pocket loss to the extent the executory promise is unperformed
at the time the holder learns of dishonor of the instrument,"' 24 but
this comment does not refer to the warranty provisions of the article
as the basis for saying that the holder can avoid out-of-pocket loss.
The point is illustrated by a hypothetical case involving a sale of
goods, in which a seller who has taken a third-party check from
the buyer as a down payment on the price of goods to be delivered
later finds that he is unable to collect payment of the check because
the drawer of the check stopped payment on it, the drawer having
a defense to liability on the instrument. The comment maintains
that even if the seller is not immune to the drawer's defense, the
seller need suffer no out-of-pocket loss because the dishonor of the
check excuses the seller from his obligation to deliver the goods
25
under Article 2 of the Code.
The illustration given in the comment is, indeed, a case where
the transferee of the negotiable instrument does not need holder in
due course status to avoid out-of-pocket loss, so it may be that the
122. In the case of any defect in title, the broad transfer warranty of title of
pre-1990 Articles 3 and 4 protected the purchaser. See supra text accompanying
note 109. If the purchaser was unable to enforce the instrument because of some
defense, the purchaser was protected in most instances by a broad transfer warranty
against defenses. U.C.C. § 3-417(2) (1989) states: "Any person who transfers an
instrument and receives consideration warrants to his transferee and if the transfer
is by indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good faith
that . . . (d) no defense of any party is good against him .

. . ."

If the transfer

was by qualified indorsement, this warranty was reduced to a warranty that the
indorser "had no knowledge of such a defense." Id. § 3-417(3). Article 4 provided
that "[e]ach customer and collecting bank who transfers an item and receives a
settlement or other consideration for it warrants to his transferee and to any
subsequent collecting bank who takes the item in good faith that . . . (d) no defense
of any party is good against him . . ." There was no provision reducing the scope

of this
123.
124.
125.

warranty in cases of qualified indorsements. Id. § 4-207(2).
See supra note 112.
U.C.C. § 3-303 cmt. 2 (1990).
Id.
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purchaser should not have holder in due course status. At any rate,
the purchaser of the instrument gets no less protection than was
true under the pre-1990 version of Article 3. But what of purchasers
of negotiable instruments who are not excused from having to
perform their promises by the provisions of Article 2? The official
comment is silent about the source of their protection.
A purchaser who discovers that a party to the instrument has
a defense which would be good against anyone but a holder in due
course may be adequately protected by the transferor's warranty
against defenses, which is at least as broad under the 1990 Official
Text as it was before. 2 6 When a superior property claim surfaces,
however, the purchaser may have no warranty protection against it,
since a transferor now warrants only that he is a "person entitled
to enforce" the instrument, and it is not at all clear that the purchaser
can avoid out-of-pocket loss by rescission of the purchase or oth-

erwise. 127
In summary, the 1990 version of Article 3 continues the rule
that a promise is value for holder in due course purposes only to
the extent that the promise has been performed. The same reason
for the rule is offered in the revised comments as appeared in the
comments to the earlier text, but the warranty provisions of the
prior text which validated the reasoning no longer fully support it,
and full support cannot be found in the text of the revised code.
There are two possible solutions to this problem. One is to
resort to the common law for authority that a purchaser who has
given an executory promise and learns of a defect in title before
126. Id. § 3-416(a)(4) states: "A person who transfers an instrument for consideration warrants to the transferee and, if the transfer is by indorsement, to any
subsequent transferee that ...

the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim

in recoupment of any party which can be asserted against the warrantor ...
Section 4-207(a)(4) indicates that
[a] customer or collecting bank that transfers an item and receives a
settlement or other consideration warrants to the transferee and to any
subsequent collecting bank that .

.

"

. the item is not subject to a defense

or claim in recoupment (Section 3-305(a)) of any party that can be asserted
against the warrantor ....
Id. § 4-207(a)(4). The warranty is arguably broader than the prior warranty against
defenses because it expressly extends to claims in recoupment.
However, it is not clear that the purchaser is as well protected as before since
neither the revised text of the code nor the official comments refer to rescission,
cancellation, or any similar remedy as being available for breach of warranty.
Compare the comment to the prior text quoted supra note 112. The only remedy
mentioned is one of damages, which may be a less satisfactory remedy than simply
calling off the purchase transaction. U.C.C. § 3-416(b), 4-207(c) (1990). Perhaps,
however, a court could recognize a right of rescission as a matter of common law.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 106-110.
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performing can cancel his obligation to perform. The second solution
is to use the assertion in the comment to revised section 3-303 that
the purchaser can avoid out-of-pocket loss by escaping his obligation
to perform as reflective of an underlying policy either to provide
such protection in all cases or to treat an executory promise as
value whenever other Uniform Commercial Code rules do not excuse
the purchaser from his obligation to perform, and then to find
implications in the section to such effect by authority of section 1102(1). 128 The first course invites the courts to reinvent the warranty
of rightful transfer which the revisers of the code deleted from its
text, a very roundabout and uncertain solution to the problem. The
second course extends the scope of section 3-303 well beyond the
natural meaning of its language, and courts may balk at reading
so much into it.
IX.

CONCLUSION

It is perhaps inevitable that an extensive revision of a statute
will raise problems of interpretation unanticipated by the drafters
and produce results they did not foresee. Most of the anomalies
discussed in the foregoing text are probably of this nature. They
are troublesome, nonetheless.
It may be contended that the problems discussed in this article
are unlikely to arise in real life and that the revisers of the code
were concerned with more practical issues and answers. It is not
impossible for such problems to arise, however, and to the extent
that the 1990 revisions of Articles 3 and 4 make it more difficult
to resolve them satisfactorily than did the previous versions of these
articles, the revisions can legitimately be found wanting.
Of the eight problems discussed in this article, two can be
29
resolved by sound construction of the text of the revised code.
A third problem is quite intractable, and a sensible solution can be
achieved only by ignoring express language of the code. 30 The
solutions to the other five problems must be found, it seems, either
outside the code or by finding underlying purposes or policies in
128. See supra text accompanying note 22.
129. The question of whether a certification of a check must include the signature
of the acceptor involves an ambiguity in statutory language, which can be overcome
by reference to related and clearer rules in the same article. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37. The misleading definition of "properly payable" in revised
§ 4-401(a) should yield to a sounder reading in the light of the official comments
to the section. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 67-89 (discussing the negotiability of an
instrument which incorporates by reference the terms of an oral agreement).
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Article 3 rules which can serve as bases for inferring code provisions
supplementary to the express text. The pre-revision text of Article
3 yielded satisfactory answers to all of these problems.
The narrowed scope of the revised text of Article 3 seems to
be the result of an effort to provide clearer and more precise rules
to govern the situations the drafters had in mind as the typical
applications of the rules. A by-product of that effort, however, was
leaving a larger number of atypical situations adrift than did the
former version of Article 3.
None of the problems discussed here are so serious that they
should lead legislatures to refuse adoption of the changes embodied
in the 1990 Official Text, which do clarify many code rules and
effect real improvements in the law. However, there are loose ends,
and it is believed that the changes do little to promote the cause
of uniformity of the law or to give the courts guidance in dealing
with them. It would be preferable for the code's sponsors to amend
either the official text or the comments to deal with the problems
posed by the 1990 revisions, and to point the way to sound and
satisfying solutions regarding them.

